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RECENT DECISIONS
doubtedly correct under principles of stare decisis and strict construction of
precedent.
On the other hand, while this interpretation stands now, it would appear
inevitable that further change will occur. Stoutly opposed to the strict interpretation of Campbell and McDonald are the views of Judge Burger and
more than likely at least two other judges of the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, Judges Bastian and Miller. Just as Judge Burger's views in Blocker
were influential in McDonald and wrought important modifications upon Durham, perhaps his expansive views in Gray, formed in the spirit of McDonald,
will ultimately prevail and lead either to the reversal of Durham or the reestablishment of the right-wrong and control tests to independent and co-equal
status with Durham in the District of Columbia.
JOSEPH S. FoRxrA
PHYSICAL AND MENTAL ExAMINATioNs OF DEFENDANTS UNDER RuLE

35

I
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 19371 it
was considered a gross breach of the sacred right of the privacy of the person
to force any person to submit to a physical or mental examination against
his will 2 To protect this policy the Supreme Court impressively decided that
there was no inherent power in a federal court to make or enforce an order
to submit to such an examination--despite the observation in the dissent that
even at common law physical or mental examinations were often ordered when
the ends of justice required.4 The "inviolability of a person" policy prevailed
until the promulgation of Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Prior to Rule 35(a) a person could bring suit in a federal court seeking redress
for alleged injuries, yet shield himself from examination of those alleged injuries by the other party by pleading the inviolability of his person. Rule
35(a), however, allows the court in its discretion to order a mental or physical
examination of a party when that party's mental or physical condition are in
controversy and good cause for such examination is shown. 5
1. For an official text of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as they read when they
become effective in 1938, see 308 U.S. 645. These Rules were drafted pursuant to the
authority of the Rules Enabling Act of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 723b, 723c (1934). The present Enabling Act is found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2072 (1952)
and an up-to-date text of the rules is found at the end of title 28 U.S.C.A.
2. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 25 (1891).
3. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, supra note 2. But cf. Camden & Suburban Ry. Co.
v. Stetson, 177 U.S. 172 (1900) and People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 10 Ill. 2d 288, 139
N.E.2d 780 (1957) which recognize such inherent power to order physical or mental
examinations in state courts.
4. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 25 (1891) (Brewer, J. dissenting). See
also 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2220 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
5. The text of Rule 35(a) is as follows:
(a) Order for Examination. In an action in which the mental or physical condition
of a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The constitutionality of the Rule, which is a direct contradiction of the
"inviolability of the person" policy, was upheld by the Seventh Circuit in
1940,6 and one year later in the famous case of Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.7 the
Supreme Court, by a 5 to 4 vote, decided that Rule 35(a) was within the
mandate of the Enabling Act of Congress and was not an abridgement of the
substantive rights of the individual. 8 The Court in Sibbach refused to equate
"substantive" with "important" or "substantial" and concluded that the Rule
came squarely within the meaning of procedure. It should be emphasized, however, that if it were not for Rule 35(a) the cases denying the inherent power
in the federal courts to compel anyone to submit to a physical or mental examination would still be good law.9 Therefore, "the Rule creating de novo the
obligation to submit should be strictly construed."' 1° The requirements for
compelling examination under the Rule, in this light, become extremely important. A brief discussion of them is warranted.
First, Rule 35(a) provides that the trial court "may order" an examination. It is clear that the granting of such an order rests within the sound discretion of the court.'1 This discretion is given a broad scope. For instance, it
has been held that "even after determining that a physical or mental examination is advisable the power still rests with the court to determine the physician
who shall conduct the examination."' 2 Given the court's discretionary power,
the following requirements constitute the framework within which that discretion must operate.
The physical or mental condition of a party must be "in controversy."' 0
The "in controversy" requirement appears to be the least questioned aspect of
Rule 35(a). An interesting district court case decided shortly after the promulgation of the Rules raised the question for the first time.14 The case involved
a suit for damages for alleged libel. Defendant was charged with having made
certain defamatory statements concerning plaintiff's physical and mental
character. On defendant's motion for examination of the plaintiff, the court
held that the physical and mental condition of the plaintiff was not "in conhim to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician. The order
may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the party
to be examined and to all other parties and shall specify the time, place, manner,
conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it is
to be made.
6. Countee v. United States, 112 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1940).
7. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
8. The present Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, which is substantially similar to the
Act of 1934, reads in part as follows: "Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right .... "
9. Fong Sik Leung v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1955).
10. Id. at 76.
11. See Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1952); Teche Lines, Inc. v. Boyette,
111 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1940); The Italia, 27 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
12. The Italia, supra note 11, at 786. See also Leach v. Grief Bros. Cooperage Corp,
2 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. Miss. 1942).
13. See Fong Sik Leung v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1955); Beach v. Beach
114 F.2d 479 (D. C. Cir. 1940); Wadlow v. Humberd, 27 F. Supp. 210 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
14.

Wadlow v. Humberd, supra note 13.
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troversy" as required by Rule 35(a). The court reasoned that the controversy
was whether defendant wrote the alleged statements with a malicious mindnot whether plaintiff's mental and physical condition were actually such. The
case has been criticized 15 and does not appear to be controlling today. The "in
controversy" requirement is generally met if a party's physical or mental condition have any substantial relationship to the subject of the lawsuit. 16 Because
of the scope of the "good cause" requirement, however, the "in controversy"
question is seldom raised.
"The order may be made only on motion for good cause shown. ....
In determining "good cause" the court must weigh the necessity and probative
value of an examination on the one hand, against the ever-present "inviolability
of the person" consideration on the other hand.' 8 To illustrate, in one instance
it was held not to be an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for a physical
examination where plaintiff had disavowed damages for any present suffering
and sought redress only for past physical injury and mental disturbance from
which he had fully recovered. 19 Yet in another instance, where it appeared
doubtful to the court that defendant had a legal defense, an examination was
allowed defendant under Rule 35 (a) to determine the extent of plaintiff's
injuries despite the fact that the examination carried with it the possibilities
of considerable pain and discomfort to the plaintiff.20 The standard of "good
cause" under Rule 35(a) is much higher than under the other discovery
rules. 2 1 The rationale of this strict standard is that "under Rule 35, the invasion of the individual's privacy by a physician or mental examination is so
serious that a strict standard of good cause, supervised by the district courts,
22
is manifestly appropriate."
Finally-and of most significance to the scope of this paper-the breadth
and/or limitation of the persons who may be examined under Rule 35(a)
raises numerous and interesting questions. The Rule specifically speaks of the
examination of a party whose physical or mental condition are in controversy.
23
The applicability of this condition has been strictly construed by the courts.
A guardian ad litem, therefore, is not a "party" within the meaning of
Rule 35(a); nor are the parents of a petitioner in a nationality suit considered
parties. 24 This extremely narrow interpretation of the "party" requirement
.117

15. Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479, 482 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
16. See, e.g., Beach v. Beach, supra note 15; Fong Sik Leung v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74
(9th Cir. 1955).
17. Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(a).
18. Compare Guilford Natl Bank v. Southern Ry. Co., 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962)
and Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Torres, 255 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1958) with Leach v. Grief
Bros. Cooperage Corp., 2 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. Miss. 1942) and Klein v. Yellow Cab Co., 7
F.R.D. 169 (N.D Ohio 1944, 1945).
19. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Torres, supra note 18.
20. Klein v. Yellow Cab Co., 7 F.R.D. 169 (N.D. Ohio 1944, 1945).
21. See Guilford Nat'1 Bank v. Southern Ry. Co., 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962).
22. Id. at 924.
23. Fong Sik Leung v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1955).
24. Dulles v. Quan Yoke Fong, 237 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1956); Chin Nee Deu v.
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under Rule 35(a) caused considerable comment and criticism which resulted
in the recommendation of a proposed amendment to the Rule in 1955 which
would have expanded its scope to include examination of "the blood relationship of a .party or of an agent or a person in the custody or under the legal
control of a party."2 5 The proposal, however, was not included in the amended
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopted in 1963. Rule 35(a) remains un26
changed.
II
From the foregoing discussion it might appear that the requirement that
the person to be examined must be a party is an extremely narrow authorization. But a question of the broadness of the "party" requirement of Rule
35(a) is very much in existence, as well as the question of its limitations.
Until recently, however, the problem of breadth apparently was never squarely
faced. The problem, simply stated, is this: How do you justify or explain the
applicability of Rule 35(a) to examination of the party who does not resort
to the federal courts? The suggested theory behind Rule 35(a) begs the
question. It has been argued in support of the Rule that a person who comes
into the federal courts seeking redress for his injuries has, in effect, waived
the right to claim the protection of the sanctity of the body or mind. He must
disclose that for which he seeks recovery: "In the interests of justice, the
plaintiff, by seeking relief, must submit to a physical examination to aid in
the ascertainment of the truth of his claims-he may not conceal, or make
difficult of proof, that which is the very basis of his action and which is particularly within his knowledge." 2 7 Obviously, the same argument cannot be
used to justify compelling a defendant-or a plaintiff who has had his case
removed to a federal court against his will-to submit to a physical or mental
examination. Until now, however, there appears to have been no need for any
further justification or rationale. The situation simply has not arisen. In
practically all personal injury suits it is the plaintiff's physical or mental
condition as a result of such injury that is in controversy-certainly not the
defendant's. Also, since most states have a substantially similar examination
Dulles, 18 F.R.D. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). But cf. Lee Wing Get v. Dulles, 18 F.R.D. 415
(E.D.N.Y. 1955) where the district court held that an alleged mother may be required to
submit to blood tests, though not a party, since maternity had been put in issue. The
federal court seems to look primarily to the provisions of New York's Civ. Prac. Act
§ 306-a (now N.Y. CPLR § 3121(a)), rather than to Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(a).
25. Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Courts 29 (Oct. 1955), quoted in 4 Moore, Federal Practice 35.01 at 2552
(Supp. 1962). See also, for a discussion of the background of the proposed amendment to
Rule 35(a), Note, Physical examination of non-parties under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 43 Iowa L. Rev. 375 (1958).

26. For a discussion of the Amendments to the Federal Rules which were adopted
see Kaplan, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963 (pts. I & II),
77 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 801 (1964).
27. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 321 F.2d 43, 49 (7th Cir. 1963). See also Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) and People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 10 Ill. 2d 288, 139

N.E.2d 780 (1957).
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rule,28 it is well-nigh impossible for a plaintiff to be in the position of being
forced to transfer to a federal court from a state court which does not have a
similar provision in its own rules. By reason of a recent United States Court
of Appeals decision, however, the question must be squarely faced.
In Schlagenhauf v. Holder29 the question of "whether a federal district
court has the power to order a mental or physical examination of a person
who is a defendant in a tort action" was raised for the first time.30 The case
arose out of a collision in Indiana between a Greyhound bus, driven by
Schlagenhauf, and a trailer owned by National Lead Co. and being pulled by
Contract Carriers, Inc. The original action was brought by a husband and
wife who were passengers on the bus for damages for personal injuries arising
out of the accident. The Greyhound Corporation, Schlagenhauf, Contract Carriers, Inc., their driver, and the National Lead Co. were all named as party
defendants. Both Greyhound and National Lead cross-claimed for damages to
their respective vehicles. 31 In National Lead's cross-claim, which named Greyhound and Schlagenhauf as defendants, it was alleged that Greyhound, by and
through its agent and employee Schlagenhauf, had acted carelessly and negligently by permitting the bus to be operated upon a public highway when
both Greyhound and Schlagenhauf knew that the eyes and vision of Schlagenhauf were impaired and deficient.3 2 A petition for an order requiring Schlagenhauf to submit to a series of medical and physical examinations was filed. The
reasons for the request were that Schlagenhauf had been involved in a similar
type accident in the past; that the lights on the trailer were clearly visible for
a considerable distance; and that Schlagenhauf had admitted to seeing the
lights some ten to fifteen seconds before the collision but had failed to slow
down or apply the brakes or make any effort whatsoever to avoid the collision. 3 The District Court granted the petition and ordered Schlagenhauf to
submit to examination by nine named specialists, 34 whereupon Schlagenhauf instituted the present petition to the Seventh Circuit for a writ of mandamus
against the district judge. The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, held
that the order of the district judge was within his discretionary power and
denied the petition for mandamus.
After observing that a writ of mandamus could only be issued upon a
showing of a clear case of abuse of discretion, 35 Circuit Judge Swygert, speaking for the court, proceeded to give a brief background of Rule 35(a) concluding that the Rule, or similar rules, have a sound and established place
28.
29.
30.

See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2220 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
321 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 375 U.S. 983 (1964).
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 321 F.2d 43, 45 (7th Cir. 1963).

31. The complicated procedural framework is outlined in the opinion, id. at 46.
32. Id. at 47.
33. Id. at 51.

34. Id. at 47 (Two named internists, two named ophthalmologists, three named neurologists and two named psychiatrists. Note that only four examinations were requested).
35. Id. at 47, citing Labuy v. Howes Leather, 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
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in the discovery provisions of both the state and federal courts. 80 Turning to
the requirements of Rule 35(a), the Court determined that since Schlagenhauf
was "the only human element utilized in the operation of the Greyhound bus
involved in the accident," 37 and because of the other related circumstances
surrounding the accident, his mental and physical condition were definitely "in
controversy." But the "in controversy" requirement alone is not enough. "Good
cause" to require defendant to submit to the burden of the examinations must
be weighed against the need of this type of discovery. The Court concluded
on this point that the district judge did not abuse his discretion.
The dissent, per Circuit Judge Kiley, takes issue with the majority's determination of "good cause." Judge Kiley is unable to see how "good cause"
for the examinations ordered can be determined absent at least a brief hearing
which would have indicated either an alternative route to determine Schlagenhauf's condition, or would have substantiated the merit in the request for the
examinations. "In either event, the inquiry would establish an adequate basis
for exercising the court's discretion as to whether or not the order ought to
issue." 38 Rule 35(a) says nothing about a hearing, although it may be possible
to argue that it is implied under the "good cause shown" language. Also, as
the dissent points out, there is a greater standard of "good cause" recognized
for Rule 35(a) than under the other discovery rules.3 9 Certainly it can be
argued that this greater standard impliedly required some sort of pre-trial
hearing under Rule 35(a). The fact of the matter is, however, that most cases
do not utilize hearings, leaving "good cause" entirely within the court's
40
sound discretion.
Regardless of the results of such a hearing, the dissent definitely concluded that the order for nine mental and physical examinations was a clear
and flagrant abuse of discretion and need not await review on appeal from a
final judgment-long after the privacy and dignity of the person have been
violated-as the majority suggests. The question of whether more than one
examination is authorized under Rule 35(a) has been decided affirmatively by
looking to the language of the rule-viz.: "the person or persons by whom it
[the examination] is to be made." 4 1 "A reading of Rule 35(a) does not indicate an intent to establish a single examination limitation, and where alleged
injuries fall into two entirely separate areas of medical specialization, examina36.
37.
38.
39.

Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 321 F.2d 43, 48 (7th Cir. 1963).
Id. at 51.
id. at 52 (Kiley, J.dissenting).
Id. at 51 (Kiley, J. dissenting), citing Guilford Natl Bank v. Southern Ry. Co.,
297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962).
40. See, e.g., Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1952); Leach v. Grief Bros,
Cooperage Corp., 2 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. Miss. 1942). But cf. Dinsel v. Penn. R.R. Co., 144
F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Pa. 1956) and Klein v. Yellow Cab Co., 7 F.R.D. 169 (N.D. Ohio 1944,
1945) where extensive pre-trial conferences were used to determine whether there was

sufficient "good cause."

41. Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(a). (Emphasis added.)
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tion by practitioners in such fields are to be authorized under the Rule."' 4 The
argument here is not against allowing more than one physician or specialist
to examine the defendant; rather it is a question of the extent to which such
a power may be exercised. Nine examinations-five more than requested-might
appear to be overdoing things a bit, even where there clearly is "good cause" for
examination.
The main interest of the case, however, lies not in its treatment of the
"incontroversy" and "good cause" requirements, but rather in its treatment
of the "party" requirement. Although recognizing that "this type of discovery
has most frequently been applied in situations in which the moving party is a
defendant asking for a mental or physical examination of a plaintiff so as to
ascertain the extent of the latter's injuries . . .43 the Court was faced with the
undeniable fact that the Rule uses the term "party" and that "obviously those
drafting the rules, the Supreme Court, which adopted them, and the Congress
that tacitly approved them . . .were all cognizant of the fact that 'party'
means both plaintiffs and defendants in civil litigation. '44 On that basis, therefore, the Court conceded that Schlagenhauf was a proper person to be examined
under Rule 35(a). No further reason or rationale was given, or seemed necessary, to determine that defendants are as vulnerable as plaintiffs to physical
or mental examination under the Federal Rules. Judge Kiley, in his dissent,
exclaims that "petitioner did *not put his physical and mental condition in
issue;114r but uses this argument only to show that the authorities used by the
majority do not preclude granting the writ of mandamus. 46 Thus, although
the Court opened its opinion by stating that the question of the case was
"whether a federal district court has the power to order a mental or physical
examination of a person who is a defendant,"4 7 it proceeds to pass over that
question and expand the applicability of Rule 35(a) to defendants, simply by
stating that everyone from the Supreme Court to Congress knows that "party"
means both plaintiffs and defendants.
The problem goes much deeper. The term "party," as found constitutional
in Countee v. United States'5 8 as approved in Sibbach, and as applied in the
cases following those decisions, was actually the term "party-plaintiff." 49 The
approval of the inclusion of defendants under the term "party" has heretofore
been purely dicta. This is not to say that defendants should not be subject to
examination the same as plaintiffs; rather it is here proposed that if defendants
42. Marshall v. Peters, 31 F.R.D. 238, 239 (S.D. Ohio 1962). See also Little v. Howey,
32 F.R.D. 322 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
43. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 321 F.2d 43, 48-49 (7th Cir. 1963).
44. Id. at 49.
45. Id. at 52 (Kiley, I.,dissenting).
46. Ibid.

47. Id. at 45.

48. 112 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1940).
49. For typical cases applying the Rule to plaintiffs, see Gale v. Nat'l Transp. Co.,
7 F.R.D. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Randolph v. McCoy, 29 F. Supp. 978 (S.D. Tex. 1939);
Strasser v. Prudential Ins. Co., 1 F.R.D. 125 (W.D. Ky. 1939). See also Note, 25 Va. L.
Rev. 73 (1938); Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1407 (1952).
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are to be included under the Rule as approved and held constitutional, some
reason or rationale should be given for such inclusion. So far no such justification has been forthcoming. It cannot be said that a defendant "waives" his
right of privacy of the person by being sued-an act which certainly is not
voluntary on his part. Nor can it be argued that he has "waived" his right
through the act of being negligent, since that assumes the conclusion before
the contest. Furthermore, the argument that plaintiffs cannot put their physical
or mental condition in controversy and then prevent disclosure of that condition
does not apply to defendants since they do not put their condition in controversy. Thus, the waiver rationale applied to parties who voluntarily come into
court seeking redress for their injuries cannot be applied to defendants in the
same spirit.
In an early article on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure it was said of
Rule 35(a) that
this provision . . . should prove an effective barrier to much malingering and fraudulent testimony (heretofore so difficult to rebut) as to
the real physical or mental condition of parties to civil actions. When
such a condition is vital in actual litigation, specious considerations of
the oft asserted sanctity of the body or mind and outmoded feelings
of false modesty must yield to expediency and the practical administration of justice in the courts.50
If the inclusion of defendants within that class of persons who may be examined under Rule 35(a) is to be justified, it must be done within the purpose
and spirit permeating the Federal Rules. In expressing their scope, Rule 1
states that "they shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action." 51 The Rules were designed to simplify the
procedures in determining the issues of all civil actions brought in the federal
courts, and to provide for an extensive and liberalized method of. disclosing
all the facts material to those issues .2 To allow physical and mental examinations of all defendants as well as plaintiffs certainly comes within that spirit63
But if the free disclosure principle behind Rule 35(a) is the justification for
including all parties-defendants and plaintiffs-under that Rule, why aren't
agents of a party, blood relationships of a party or persons under the legal
control of a party also included? The failure of the Supreme Court to adopt
the recommended changes to the Rule raises the question 54-which cannot be
avoided in discussing defendants under the Rule. To illustrate, note the district court case of Krop v. General Dynamics Corp.55 In that case the plaintiff
sued the owner of a truck for damages for injuries sustained when struck by
50. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 Va. L. Rev. 261, 280 (1939).
51. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
52. See generally Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 942 (1961).
53. See generally King, Study of Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
11 S.C.L.Q. 183 (1959).
54. See authorities cited note 25 supra.
55. 202 F. Supp. 207 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
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the truck. The plaintiff sought to have the driver of the truck-who was not
made a party to the suit against the owner-submit to a physical examination
to determine his qualifications for driving a truck. The Court held that since
the driver was not a party, the Court had no jurisdiction to compel him to
submit to a physical examination. The case is strikingly similar to the Schlagenhauf case, except that in Schlagenhauf the party seeking the examination
did not make the mistake of not naming the driver of the bus as a party defendant. The distinction appears to be a weak and artificial one, especially
when considering the intended scope of the Rule.5 6 If the theory behind the
Rule is to be fulfilled, then all persons whose physical or mental condition
are reasonably related to the lawsuit should come within the scope of the Rule
and the proposed amendments should be adopted. If, however, the Supreme
Court cannot justify the breach of "the inviolability of the person" policy to
that extent, then only those persons who "waive" the protection of that policy
by putting their mental or physical condition in issue (i.e., plaintiffs or defendants on their counterclaims) should be compelled to submit to examination under the Federal Rules. The middle ground taken by Rule 35(a) is
unsound and inexplicable.
III
State legislatures and state courts have taken a variety of approaches to
this particular discovery problem. Long before Rule 35(a) gave the federal
district courts the power to order physical and mental examinations of parties,
the constitutionality of state legislation providing for such examinations had
been sustained by the courts. 57 Even in states where there was no legislation
on the topic, the inherent power to order physical and mental examinations
was often found in the state courts.58 Therefore, the United States Supreme
Court decision denying the inherent power to order physical and mental examinations is generally restricted in applicability to the federal courts alone 9
Since many state courts had recognized that similar examinations had always
been allowed when necessary,60 Rule 35(a) was by no means a revolutionary
advancement in the field of discovery-except for the federal courts. Just as
56. Under some sort of implied waiver idea it would seem even more logical to allow
examination of a plaintiff's agent than of a defendant. Note how minor permutations of the
facts lead to wholly different conclusions in applying the Rule to Schlagenhauf and point
up the Rule's specious reasoning. For example, he is a plaintiff's agent under Greyhound's
cross-claim and not subject to the Rule. But if he cross-claimed himself he would be a
party and subject to the Rule. If Schlagenhauf owned the bus he was driving would he
be the type of party subject to the Rule? What if he were a major stockholder of the bus
company?
57. McGovern v. Hope, 63 N.J.L. 76, 42 Atl. 830 (1899); Lyon v. Manhattan Ry.
Co., 142 N.Y. 298, 37 N.E. 113 (1894). See also Camden & Suburban Ry. Co. v. Stetson,
177 U.S. 172 (1900).
58. See People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 10 Ill. 2d 288, 139 N.E.2d 780 (1957). But
cf, King, supra note 53, at 189, where the author indicates that since there is no South
Carolina Court Rule authorizing physical or mental examinations there probably is.no
power in the courts to order such examinations.
59. See Camden & Suburban Ry. Co. v. Stetson, 177 U.S. 172 (1900).
60. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2220 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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the Federal Rules as a whole are the basis for the court rules of many states,0 1
Rule 35(a) is the basis for most of the state court rules authorizing physical
and mental examinations in civil actions. Many states have adopted Rule 35 (a)
02
exactly, or a substantially similar rule allowing examination of all parties.
Many other states have expanded their rules to include all parties and their
agents, blood relationships, and other persons under the legal control of parties,
as recommended by the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules in 1955.08
Although only a few states have restricted their physical and mental examination rules to include only plaintiffs in personal injury suits, 4 the highest court
in at least one state has held that the purpose of its rule-which is substantially similar to the Federal Rule 35(a)-is.to secure or preserve to a defendant the right, in a proper case, to have the injured party examined.0 5
Generally speaking, the state courts have been much less hesitant to require examinations when it appears necessary to obtain justice or for the public
welfare. For instance, in New York there are no fewer than fifty-eight separate
statutory provisions for mental or physical examinations of some sort.00 As for
physical and mental examinations in personal injury suits, the old and the
new statutes in New York provide an interesting study of both ends of the
spectrum of rules of civil procedure.
Prior to September 1, 1963, the New York Civil Practice Act, section 306,
gave defendant the right to a physical examination before trial of the person
of the plaintiff, where he could show that he was ignorant of the nature and
extent of the plaintiff's injuries. 67 The purpose of such examination was "to
enable the defendant to discover the truth in regard to the injuries claimed
to have been received. ' 68 Thus, prior to the effective date of the new Civil
Practice Law and Rules in 1963, New York strictly followed the "waiver" rationale indicated in the Sibbach case.
61.

Some states which have adopted the Federal Rules substantially are: Arizona,

Colorado, Delaware, Kentucky, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and West Virginia.

62. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 35(a); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 28-357 (1962); Colo. R. Civ. P. 35(a);
Dela. Chancery R. 35(a) and Superior Ct. Civ. R. 35(a); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.29; Iowa R.
Civ. P. 132; Ky. R. Civ. P. 35.01; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 510.040 (1952); Mont. R. Civ. P.
35(a); Nev. R. Civ. P. 35(a); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1, Rule 35(a) (1953); Pa. R. Civ.
P. 4010; Utah R. Civ. P 35(a); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1263 (1963 Supp.); Va. R. Sup.
Ct. of Appeals 3:23(d); W. Va. R. Civ. P. 35(a).
63. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2032; Idaho R. Civ. P. 35(a); Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 110,
§ 101.17-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1963); Md. R. Civ. P. 420; Minn. R. Civ. P. 35.01; N.D.R.
Civ. P. 35(a); S.D. Code § 36.0602 (Supp. 1960); Wyo. R. Civ. P. 35(a).
64. Hawaii Rev. Laws § 225-2 (1955); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 269.57 (1957).
65. Virginia Linen Service, Inc. v. Allen, 198 Va. 700, 96 S.E.2d 86, 88 (1957).
66. See Table of New York Statutory Provisions infra.

67. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 306 read, in part, as follows:
Physical examination. In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, if

the defendant shall present to the court satisfactory evidence that he is ignorant
of the nature and extent of the injuries complained of, the court, by order, shall
direct that the plaintiff submit to a physical examination by one or more physicians
or surgeons to be designated by the court or judge, and such examination shall
be had and made under such restrictions and directions as to the court or judge

shall seem proper . . ..
68. 5 Carmody-Wait, Cyclopedia of New York Practice 632 (1953).
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A complete about-face occurs in New York, however, with the advent of
New York's new practice act. In effect, New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules section 3121(a) has completely adopted the liberal approach which
was refused by the Supreme Court. Now in New York, any party, or agent,
employee or person in custody or under the legal control of a party may be
subject to physical or mental examination. 69 But the new rule goes even further.
Such examination no longer requires an order of the court. "[A]ny party may
serve notice on another party to submit" to a physical or mental examination.
Actually, however, the court still has the final determination of the propriety
of one party ordering another to submit to examination through the use of
a protective order:
The court may at any time on its own initiative, or on motion of
any party or witness, make a protective order denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating the use of any disclosure device. Such order
shall be designed to prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice to any person or the
courts. 70

69. N.Y. CPLR § 3121(a) reads, in part, as follows:
After commencement of an action in which the mental or physical condition of
the blood relationship of a party, or of an agent, employee or person in the custody or under the legal control of a party, is in controversy, any party may serve
notice on another party to submit to a physical, mental or blood examination by
a designated physician, or to produce for such examination his agent, employee or
the person in his custody or under his legal control ....
70. N.Y. CPLR § 3103(a).
NEW YORK STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR MENTAL AND PHYSICAL
EXAMINATIONS
N.Y. CPLR § 3121 (General provision);
N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 50(6) (Authority to examine applicants for Civil Service employment);
N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 71 (Examination as requirement for reinstatement after separation
for disability) ;
N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 482 (Examination before pronouncing judgment);
N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 931 (Examination by probation officers);
N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 939 (Authorization of physical and mental examinations in probation matters) ;
N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 943 (Authorization for fingerprints);
N.Y. Correc. Law § 214 (Examination required for consideration by parole board);
N.Y. Correc. Law § 384 (Examination at expiration of sentence in State Hospital);
N.Y. Correc. Law § 408 (Examination for transfer to State Hospital);
N.Y. Correc. Liw §§ 438, 440 (Examination of mentally defective delinquents);
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 13(a) (Physical examination and serological test of applicants for
marriage license) ;
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 141(3) (Examination of defendant in suit to annul marriage on
grounds of incurable insanity);
N.Y. Educ. Law § 511 (Examination required under teacher's disability retirement plan);
N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 901, 904 (Medical examinations of pupils of public schools);
N.Y. Educ. Law § 913 (Medical examinations of teachers and other employees);
N.Y. Educ. Law § 3222 (Physical examination of minor applying for an employment certificate) ;
N.Y. Educ. Law § 3624 (Examination of school bus drivers);
N.Y. Educ. Law § 4810 (Quarantine and examination of pupils committed to a home school);
N.Y. Emp. Liab. Law § 10 (Physical examination of claimant under compensation plan);
N.Y. Executive Law § 215(2) (Examination of State Police applicants);
N.Y. Executive Law § 242(2) (Examination of prisoners considered for pardon or communication of sentence);
N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 251 (Power in Family Court to order any person within its juris-
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The last sentence quoted above is strikingly similar to the stated scope of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, yet the New York rule now affords much
broader discovery power in this area to be used by the parties themselves. At
the same time, however, ample protective power is retained by the courts of
New York to avoid any abuse of this sweeping discovery power. Just how this
new approach will work will be interesting to observe.
IV
In conclusion, where a federal court was given to opportunity to justify or
explain the inclusion of defendants under the examination rule for the first
time, it failed to do so. Yet treatment of defendants the same as plaintiffs
under the Rule can be, and should have been, given a sound basis. That basis
is found in the spirit of the Federal Rules themselves-viz.: free, liberal and
dependable provisions for the speedy and efficient discovery of all the facts of
an action. The fault with the Federal Rule-and the only reason for raising
the question of defendants under the Rule-is that it is not broad enough. It
diction, or any parent or other person legally responsible for the care of any child
within its jurisdiction to be examined);
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 403(3), 409(1) (Physical examination required for license to practice
hairdressing and cosmetology);
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 433(3), 441(1) (Physical examination required for barber's license);
N.Y. Munic. Law § 50(h) (Examination of claimants against municipal corporations);
N.Y. Munic. Law § 129(6) (Examination upon admission to a hospital);
N.Y. Munic. Law §§ 205(2), 207-a, 207-c (Examination of injured firemen or policemen
as requirement to payment for such injury);
N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 162(1) (k), 164(3) (A) (Medical examination of claimant under insurance
policy);
N.Y. Lab. Law § 139 (Power of Department of Labor to examine employed minors);
N.Y. Lab. Law § 206(a) (Physical examination of females by employer governed by certain
rules) ;
N.Y. Lab. Law § 428 (Physical examination of workers in compressed air);
N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 210 (Examination of suspected narcotics addict);
N.Y. Mil. Law § 71 (Physical examination before promotion or appointment as commissioned officer in Militia);
N.Y. Mil. Law § 216(3) (Examination of militiamen when injured or disabled in service);
N.Y. Pen. Law § 817 (Production and examination of child to determine its age);
N.Y. Pen. Law § 2188 (Examination required before probation);
N.Y. Pen. Law § 2189-a (Psychiatric examination before imposing sentence of one day to
life);
N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 2300, 2301 (Examination and isolation of one suspected of having
a venereal disease);
N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2302 (Examination for venereal disease of all persons arrested
for vagrancy);
N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2308 (Blood test for syphilis of pregnant woman);
N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2571 (Examination of all children before admission to a state
hospital) ;
N.Y. R.R. Law § 63 (Examination of prospective railroad employees);
N.Y. Rapid Transit Law § 16-a(3) (Examination of employees requesting sick leave);
N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1194 (Presumed consent to chemical test of breath, blood,
urine or saliva to determine alcohol content);
N.Y. Village Law § 194 (Examination of policemen to qualify for pension);
N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law §§ 13, 19 (Physical examination of injured employee) (See
also Workman's Comp. Rules & Regulations, Rule 11);
N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 8925 (McKinney 1961) (Examination of boxers);
N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Act § 86 (Examination of women convicted of certain immoral offenses).
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is not logical to include defendants and not agents, employees, etc., of parties.
If a restricted rule is deemed desirable under the inviolability of the person
policy, then it should be applicable to plaintiffs alone, since the reason for the
strict approach-the sanctity of the body and mind-allows for the examination
of plaintiffs alone via the "waiver" theory. The Supreme Court, therefore,
should have either accepted the recommendations of the Advisory Committee,
or it should have removed defendants from the coverage of the Rule.
PETER H. BicKFO R

TAXATION-BAD DEBTS: LIMITATIONS OF THE "PROMOTER DocTRINE"

A stockholder will often advance loans to his corporation in order to facilitate its expansion or in order to maintain its operation. Although it is not a
very frequent occurrence in the case of large, widely held corporations, such
advances are very common among shareholders of closely held corporations.
The shareholder-creditor is usually a small entrepreneur, operating his business in the corporate form. As is often the case, ensuing financial difficulties
prevent the corporation from paying these loans. Subsequently, the shareholdercreditor will seek a business bad debt deduction from his gross income. He
can, however, take an ordinary deduction, as distinguished from a capital loss
deduction, only if he can show that his advances to the corporation were
genuine loans within the context of section 166(a) of the Code, i.e., that the
debt became worthless during the taxable year, and that the debt was incurred
in his trade or business. 1 The latter requirement has been the subject of substantial litigation and is the subject now under consideration.
During the ten year period prior to his establishment of the Mission
2
Orange Bottling Co. of Lubbock, Inc., Whipple, the taxpayer in instant case,
was instrumental in the organization of numerous partnerships and corporations.3 In 1951, shortly before he established Mission Orange, Whipple secured
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1994, § 166: Bad Debts.
(a) General Rule.(1) Wholly worthless debts.-There shall be allowed as a deduction any debt
which becomes worthless within the taxable year.
(d)Nonbusiness Debts.(1) General Rule.-In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation-.
(B) where any nonbusiness debt becomes worthless within the taxable year,
the loss resulting therefrom shall be considered a loss from the sale or
exchange, during the taxable year, of a capital asset held for not more
than 6 months.
(2) Nonbusiness Debt Defined.-For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "nonbusiness debt" means a debt other than(A) a debt created or acquired (as the case may be) in connection with a
trade or business of the taxpayer; or
(B) a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business.
2. Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963).
3. In 1941 Whipple was a member of a series of partnerships engaged in either the

